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I. STATUTORY FRAUD
A. FACT OR OPINION? MAY DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES
T is generally understood that statements of fact-if presented as
true fact, yet presented with knowledge of their falsity-may give rise
to claims of fraud, while statements of the speaker's mere opinion
will not. The difference between a possibly-actionable "statement of
fact" and a non-actionable "statement of opinion" may, however, depend
on the circumstances and may not be all that easy to distinguish. That
was the lesson of Hawkins v. Walker.'
In Hawkins v. Walker, Mr. Walker-a builder of high-end custom
homes-was looking for a lot on which to build an expensive house for
himself. He discussed this with Mr. Hawkins, a developer of home subdi-
visions. Mr. Hawkins was then in the process of developing a new, gated
subdivision. The subdivision was not yet very far along, but Mr. Hawkins
told Mr. Walker that it would feature homes starting at $700,000, de-
signed with "world class" architecture, built only by "preferred builders"
(including Mr. Walker), and enclosed in a fence with an entrance of brick
columns with wrought iron. This intrigued and pleased Mr. Walker, and
he began to build his own expensive home in the development. 2
Unfortunately, however, no other lots were sold, and weeds began to
grow. Mr. Hawkins told Mr. Walker that he was considering selling the
rest of the lots to Pulte Homes, which would take over the developments
and build cheaper houses (in the $300,000 to 400,000 range). After fol-
lowing through on this, Mr. Walker was dismayed as this, in his view,
would substantially reduce the value of his own house.3
Mr. Walker brought suit claiming statutory fraud, under Texas Business
and Commerce Code section 27.01. Section 27.01 addresses fraud in real
estate and stock transactions. It provides that
fraud in a transaction involving real estate or stock in a corporation
or joint stock company consists of a (1) false representation of a past
or existing material fact, when the false representation is (A) made
to a person for the purpose of inducing that person to enter into a
contract; and (B) relied on by that person in entering into that con-
tract; or (2) false promise to do an act, when the false promise is (A)
material; (B) made with the intention of not fulfilling it; (C) made to
a person for the purpose of inducing that person to enter into a con-
tract; and (D) relied on by that person in entering into that contract. 4
Interestingly, the statute appears to relax the common-law scienter re-
quirement with respect to false statements of fact, while continuing to
require scienter with respect to "false promises." Here, the jury found
1. 233 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
2. See id. at 392-93.
3. See id. at 393.




Two aspects of this case were particularly interesting. The first was
how to properly characterize Mr. Hawkins' vision-as he expressed it to
Mr. Walker-of what the subdivision would be. An action for statutory
fraud would lie under section 27.01 if Mr. Hawkins' statements were char-
acterized either as (1) statements of fact which were in fact false-appar-
ently, regardless of whether Mr. Hawkins knew at the time or not that
they were false-so long as the statements were intended to induce Mr.
Walker's reliance and did have that effect or (2) as (more sinister) false
promises. If his statements were characterized as merely his opinion,
however-or as promises to Mr. Walker that were at least not "false" at
the time they were made-then they would not form a basis for an action
for statutory fraud.
In this case, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that this difference
could be assessed from the circumstances in which the statements were
made. 6 Those circumstances led the jury and trial court to find statutory
fraud, and the court of appeals to affirm it. Apparently it was clear that
Mr. Walker had built his house in reliance on Mr. Hawkins' vision of how
the subdivision would be developed, and the sales price was directly im-
pacted by a failure to perform in that respect.7 Less clear, however, was
exactly how the statements were to be characterized. The statements ap-
pear to have been cheerful visions of how the subdivision would be devel-
oped, at some point in the future. Plainly the vision did not come to pass,
but whether those statements were viewed as false statements of fact or
as "false promises" was unclear. It would be hard to see them as false
statements of fact because the subdivision had not yet been developed;
what was left seems to be a false promise, but it was not entirely clear that
Mr. Hawkins did not intend to make it a high-end subdivision at the time
he was laying it out for Mr. Walker.
A second interesting aspect arose from the fact that the accused state-
ments-or promises-were made orally, and not in writing. Under sec-
tions 26.01(a) and 26.01(b)(4) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code, a promise or agreement regarding "a contract for the sale of real
estate" is not enforceable unless the promise or agreement, or a memo-
randum of it, is in writing and signed by the person to be charged with it
(or someone lawfully authorized to sign on that person's behalf).8 These
statements or promises were not so signed by Mr. Hawkins-how then
could the fraud claim be sustained? Interestingly, the court of appeals
held that the statute of frauds only applies in benefit-of-the-bargain cases,
when the plaintiff seeks to obtain the benefit of the bargain it would have
obtained had the defendant's promise been performed. 9
5. See Hawkins, 233 S.W.3d at 387.
6. See id. at 391.
7. Id. at 395.
8. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.01(a), 26.01(b)(4) (Vernon 2002).
9. Hawkins, 233 S.W.3d at 396.
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Here, Mr. Walker did not seek that. Instead, he sought only the differ-
ence between the sales price of his home, and what it cost to complete
it.10 The jury found that Mr. Walker had built his home in reliance on
how the subdivision would be developed, and the sales price was directly
impacted by the defendant's failure to perform as projected. The court
considered these to be special damages, which in a fraud case "may be
recovered for losses or improvements to property purchased as a result of
misrepresentation."11
II. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. FORUM SELECTION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE
EFFECT OF SHESHUNOFF
In the summer of 2007, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the rela-
tionship between choice of law provisions in employment contracts, and
choice of venue provisions, particularly with respect to covenants not to
compete. In In re AutoNation, Inc.,1 2 the supreme court considered a
contract applicable to a Texas employee which contained a one-year post-
termination covenant not to compete, and which provided both that Flor-
ida law would control and that any dispute must be heard in Florida.
Key to the question was the continuing influence of DeSantis v. Wack-
enhut Corp.,13 one of the 1990 "trilogy" of non-competition cases which
were issued shortly after the 1989 enactment of sections 15.50-.52 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code.14 The enactment itself was a legis-
lative response to the court's 1987 decision in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim,
Inc.,15 sharply limiting the enforceability of post-termination non-compe-
tition covenants in Texas, particularly in cases involving "common call-
ings." In DeSantis, the Texas Supreme Court had held that "[t]he law
governing enforcement of non-competition agreements is fundamental
policy in Texas, and.. . to apply the law of another state to determine the
enforceability of such an agreements in the circumstances of a case like
this would be contrary to that policy."'16
Between 1987 and 2007, however, Texas law underwent sweeping
changes in how noncompetition covenants were assessed and reviewed;
and by the summer of 2007, the questions now were whether the principle
announced in DeSantis-never actually overruled-was still as vital as it
had been, and whether-and if so, how-it would apply in the context of
a forum selection clause providing for venue out of state.
10. Id. at 395.
11. Id. (citing Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex. 1983) (a common-law
fraud case)).
12. 228 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. 2007).
13. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
14. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-.52 (Vernon 2002).
15. See 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
16. DeSantis. 793 S.W.2d at 681.
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Now, in AutoNation, the supreme court appears to have viewed the
choice-of-law provision as distinctly different from the forum-selection
clause, and found no reason not to enforce the forum selection clause as
written in the contract. The supreme court wrote that there was no show-
ing of "fraud, overreaching, or undue hardship that would provide an ex-
ception to the rule that forum-selection clauses are generally favored. ' 17
Instead, relying on DeSantis, which involved only a choice-of-law provi-
sion, not a forum-selection clause, the supreme court viewed the plain-
tiff's claim as asserting that the court must disregard the forum selection
clause simply because the contract also concerned a non-competition pro-
vision. 18 The supreme court declined to do this and concluded that "[n]o
Texas precedent compels us to enjoin a party from asking a Florida court
to honor the parties' express agreement to litigate a non-compete agree-
ment in Florida, the employer's headquarters and principal place of
business."1 9
The supreme court appears to have been at some pains to state that it
was not retreating from its DeSantis reasoning reaffirming its validity de-
spite the roller-coaster convolutions that have occurred since 1987 in the
analysis of non-competition agreements in Texas. Accordingly, the su-
preme court held that "[o]ur decision today in no way questions the rea-
soning of DeSantis, but we decline [plaintiff's] invitation to superimpose
the DeSantis choice-of-law analysis onto the law governing forum-selec-
tion clauses," o20 and added that its holding "rests squarely on the parties'
contractual commitment."' 21 In what may have been a telling footnote,
however, the supreme court added that it "does not reach [the question
of enforceability of the underlying non-competition agreement] today,
but note[d] that [its] recent decision in Alex Sheshunoff Management Ser-
vices, LP v. Johnson,22 modified Texas law governing the enforceability of
non-competition agreements. '23
In an interesting concurrence, Justice O'Neill added the useful point
that it was not apparent that enforcement of the forum-selection clause in
this case would necessarily result in the undermining of Texas public pol-
icy. The mere indication that the Florida court would apply Florida law
would not-without more-justify a Texas court's interference with the
chosen forum. Had there been a clear showing of such a risk, however,
she indicated that she might have at least considered the trial court justi-
fied in abating the declaratory judgment action pending the Florida
court's decision.24 The Florida court, after all, might decide the matter
properly and ought, in comity, be allowed to try.
17. AutoNation Inc., 228 S.W.3d at 668.
18. Id. at 668-69.
19. Id. at 664.
20. Id. at 669.
21. Id. at 670.
22. 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006).
23. AutoNation Inc., 228 S.W.3d at 667 n.10.
24. Id. at 671.
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When read together with Sheshunoff, there may be an unstated hint in
AutoNation that the Texas Supreme Court's skepticism of, or overt hostil-
ity to, non-competition covenants during the period of approximately
1987 through 1994 may have run its course. The suggestion is that while
the evaluation of non-competition agreements may still be a matter of
fundamental public policy in Texas, the process will not be conducted so
aggressively as it may once have been in the direction of limiting or inval-
idating such agreements. Whether this is true must await further cases.
III. TRADE SECRETS
A. PROCEDURE FOR DISCOVERY OF TRADE SECRETS
The general procedure for discovering trade secrets is well understood.
A party opposing discovery requests seeking to discover its trade secrets
has the burden of proving that the discovery sought would qualify as a
trade secret25 and must present any evidence necessary to support the
privilege or objection.26 If this burden of proof is met, the burden then
shifts to the party seeking the trade secret disclosure to establish that the
information is necessary for a fair adjudication of a claim or defense in
the litigation. 27 This seems straightforward enough. Sometimes, how-
ever, what seems simple on the surface may become tangled when ap-
plied to a particular case.
Such was the case in In re Universal Coin and Bullion, Ltd.,28 In that
case, Universal Coin and Bullion, Ltd. ("Universal Coin") brought suit
against an attorney, a newspaper reporter, and two of Universal Coin's
former employees, alleging they had conspired to misappropriate the
company's confidential information regarding current and former cus-
tomers. Soon at issue were fifty-seven discovery requests directed to
Universal Coin's customer lists and other information which Universal
Coin regarded as confidential and comprising its trade secrets. The trial
court granted Universal Coin's objections and assertion of trade-secret
privilege in four of the fifty-seven requests, but denied it as to the other
fifty-three.29
Apparently the trial court's order was itself confusing, as it provided
that the court would grant a thirty-day stay from the time of entry of the
order "for the production of portions of [Universal Coin's] customer list
and [Universal Coin's] complete customer list, but there is no stay in re-
gard to the other production requests propounded on Universal Coin." '30
From the beginning, therefore, the Beaumont Court of Appeals noted
that the trial court's rulings granting and overruling the trade-secret ob-
25. See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. 2003).
26. See In re CI Host, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. 2002) (citing TEX. R. Cv. P.
193.4(a)).
27. See In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Tex. 1998).
28. 218 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.).
29. Id. at 831-32.
30. Id. at 831 (quoting the order) (emphasis added).
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jections were inconsistent: "what is at least temporarily protected by the
trade secret privilege in response to some requests is not protected by the
order in response to others. '31
More particularly, though, the court of appeals concluded that the pro-
cedure the trial court used was defective and a clear abuse of discretion,
as the trial court had "compell[ed] production of trade secret information
with no showing that trade secret disclosure is necessary in the remaining
litigation. '32 The court was mindful of the Continental General Tire re-
quirement that a trial court must "weigh the degree of the requesting
party's need for the information with the potential harm of disclosure to
the resisting party. '33 In this case the trial court did not make a determi-
nation that disclosure of this information was "necessary" to the proper
adjudication of the case, and for that matter, it also did not sign a protec-
tive order or employ "other protective techniques sufficient to prevent
disclosure beyond that which is necessary to a fair adjudication of the
facts of this case." 34
Apparently, all this resulted from considerable confusion at the trial
court level as to what discovery requests related to exactly which claims-
and which claims remained in dispute and which had been settled or re-
solved-by the time of the hearing on the resisting party's objections and
assertion of trade secret privilege. The case thus serves as a useful re-
minder both of the importance of matching requests to claims when seek-
ing relief, and of the need, in all trade secret cases, to demonstrate both
(1) the relevance of the purported trade secrets to the claims at issue, and
(2) the importance of their discovery as necessary to a fair adjudication of
the case. Discovery of trade secrets-even in cases of alleging misappro-
priation of trade secrets-is not automatic.
B. IDENTIFYING THE TRADE SECRET: "IDEAS" ARE
DIFFICULT To PROTECT
In Matrix Network, Inc. v. Ginn,3 5 the Dallas Court of Appeals was
asked to reverse a trial court's denial of a temporary injunction against a
former independent contractor and his new business which would prevent
them from marketing a new software product, the idea for which was
allegedly misappropriated from the plaintiff's business plan. In order for
"a temporary injunction to issue, the movant must plead and prove: (1) a
cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief
sought; (3) a probable, imminent and irreparable injury in the interim;
and (4) no adequate remedy at law."'36 And "the trial court does not
abuse its discretion in denying a temporary injunction if the movant failed
31. Id. at 834.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1998)).
34. Id.
35. 211 S.W.3d 944 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
36. Id. at 947 (citing Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002)).
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to prove one of the requirements. ' 37 Therefore, the court of appeals de-
clined to reverse the trial courts denial.
The court's principal reason appears to have been that plaintiff Matrix
Network, Inc. ("Matrix") failed to show how it would suffer a probable,
imminent, and irreparable injury absent a temporary injunction. Matrix's
president estimated, in terms of a dollar amount, the amount of revenue
his company would lose absent the temporary injunction. By doing so,
however, he showed that the alleged injury could be readily remedied in a
money damages award. Further, there was no evidence the defendants
had ever solicited a customer of the plaintiff; the defendants disclaimed
any intention of doing so; and there was evidence that the defendants'
product would have some features that the plaintiff's product did not
have. The court viewed the plaintiff's claimed injury, therefore, as
"merely speculative," holding that "[s]uch fear and apprehension of in-
jury are not sufficient to support a temporary injunction. 38
The heart of the plaintiff's argument was that the court should presume
harm in this case, because the defendants had clearly gained confidential
information about the plaintiff's business plan before setting out to de-
sign and develop their own service information retrieval service. Exactly
what this confidential information would be, however, and how it would
affect the plaintiff, was disputed. It appeared that the defendants were
using substantially different technology, and had testified that they in-
tended to stay away from the plaintiffs' customers while targeting the
end-users of other competitors. 39 The defendant evidently had access to
the plaintiff's business plans and ideas, but to the extent those plans and
ideas were being articulated and targeted in narrow, precise ways by ei-
ther party, it appears the defendants were not using them.
Simply having knowledge of the plaintiff's business plan-even per-
haps, if that made the defendants more knowledgeable about the indus-
try, or inspired them to ideas of how they could do things better-
appears not, at least in these circumstances, to have been sufficient to
meet the requirement of a "probable, imminent, and irreparable injury"
pending trial.40
C. ASKING A CUSTOMER FOR COPIES OF DESIGNS:
ACQUISITION By IMPROPER MEANS?
In Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc. dibla Brand FX,41 Brand
FX asserted that Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. ("Astoria") had copied
Brand FX's "stair step" design for its commercial truck body "toppers"
by "nefariously" obtaining copies of Brand FX's confidential design
37. Id. (citing Tom James of Dallas, Inc. v. Cobb, 109 S.W.3d 877, 889 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2003, no pet.)).
38. Id. at 947-48 (citing Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 742
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
39. Id. at 948.
40. Id.
41. 223 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
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drawings. Astoria denied that the drawings were confidential or
amounted to Brand FX's trade secrets, and also denied that it had ac-
quired them by improper means. 42
In determining whether the drawings constituted trade secrets in the
first place, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the now-familiar six-
factor test of In re Bass:4 3
1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business
of the entity claiming the trade secret; 2) the extent to which it was
known by employees and others involved in the business; 3) the ex-
tent of the measures taken by the entity to guard the secrecy of the
information; 4) the value of the information to the entity and its
competitors; 5) the amount of effort or money expended by the en-
tity in developing the information; and 6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
others.44
The court concluded (1) that Brand FX and its now-bankrupt predecessor
were the only source of the drawings; (2) that it and its predecessor con-
sidered the drawings confidential and told the customers who received
them that they were; and (3) that they were valuable in containing de-
tailed and specialized information for what had been designed specifically
for Cook's Pest Control (the customer whose business both parties
wanted). 45 In particular, there was evidence that the drawings were par-
ticularly valuable to Astoria, because Cook's Pest Control ("Cook's")
liked the interior configuration it had, wanted all its "toppers" to be uni-
form, and had rejected Astoria's proposed changes.46 Further, there was
evidence that Brand FX's predecessor had invested considerable money
in developing or acquiring the design drawings. 47 From all of this, the
court of appeals concluded there was more than a scintilla of evidence
that the design drawings were a trade secret.48
Liability for trade-secret misappropriation may arise from breach of a
confidential relationship, or from acquisition or discovery of the secret by
improper means. 49 Empirically, it appears that cases presenting claims of
acquisition by improper means are relatively less common than those al-
leging breach of a confidential relationship (as by departing employees),
but Astoria Industries is one such case. Improper means of acquiring an-
other's trade secrets include "theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of
confidence, and other means either wrongful in themselves or wrongful
42. Id. at 634.
43. 113 S.W.3d 735. 739 (Tex. 2003).
44. Id.
45. Astoria 223 S.W.3d at 635-36.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 636.
48. Id.
49. See Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1958) (adopting REST. OF
TORTS § 757 (1939)).
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
under the circumstances of the case." 50
In this case, it appears that when Astoria sought Cook's business,
Cook's representative told Astoria that Cook's wanted "toppers" of the
particular stair-step design it had been using. Since there was no source
for the drawings other than competitor Brand FX or Brand FX's bank-
rupt predecessor, Astoria apparently asked Cook's to give Astoria copies
of the design drawings. Cook's did so, and Astoria's chief engineer testi-
fied that he used the drawings to make sure that he incorporated the
changes that Cook's wanted. The engineer "conceded that he felt 'a little
bit' strange or awkward having a copy of [the predecessor's] drawings,
but he was not too concerned because the drawings were not marked
confidential." Apparently he "viewed the drawings as sales drawings of
the type that Astoria would send out to its customers." 51
Brand FX testified that if drawings were shared with customers, they
were "told or knew" that the drawings were confidential and were not to
be disclosed to any competitor. 52 Cook's representative testified that no-
body at Brand FX's predecessor had told him the drawings were confi-
dential, however, and apparently the drawings were not stamped with
confidential legends or otherwise. This would appear to raise an issue as
to whether or not Brand FX or its predecessor had really exercised the
sort of reasonable precautions to secure their trade secrets that a court
would normally expect of a putative trade secret owner. Nevertheless,
"[v]iewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Brand X" as the
court of appeals was required to do in review of a trial court's decision to
grant or refuse a temporary injunction request, the court concluded that
the evidence "would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach
different conclusions regarding whether Astoria misappropriated the de-
sign drawings because it discovered the drawings by improper means. '53
Consequently the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err by
denying Astoria's motion for a no-evidence summary judgment.54
Additionally, the court noted, but disposed in a footnote, Astoria's ar-
gument that it did not improperly acquire or use the drawings because it
could have obtained the same information by studying the actual stair-
step topper that Cook's had provided Astoria or the Brand FX stair-step
topper that it could have bought in the marketplace. The court noted
that "[t]he mere fact that knowledge of a product may be acquired
through lawful means such as inspection, experimentation, and analysis
does not preclude protection from those who would secure that knowl-
edge by unfair means," and that "[t]he question is not how could Astoria
have secured the knowledge, but how did it?" 55
50. Astoria, 223 S.W.3d at 636 (citing REST. (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43
(1995)).
51. Id. at 636-37.
52. Id. at 636.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 637 n.74.
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D. CUSTOMER LISTS As TRADE SECRETS
Customer lists "may" constitute trade secrets, according to the Restate-
ment of Torts, Section 757, comment b,56 but there is considerable confu-
sion in the case law as to when, why, and how this may be so. Customer
lists are frequently accorded trade secret protection. Indeed, the Hous-
ton Fourteenth District Court of Appeals described them as being "rou-
tinely" granted trade secret protection. 57
To say that customer lists-or any other species of information which is
frequently litigated-are "routinely" granted such protection may be a
pardonable exaggeration, however. Customer lists must still meet the
tests required of a trade secret. Customer lists, which are generally
known in the industry or would obviously follow from the nature of the
business and industry would not necessarily be worthy of such protection.
Protecting them from use would do little to honor confidential relation-
ships and protection against discovery of such materials by improper
means and would simultaneously raise the risk of overbroad restriction of
robust and lawful competition. The issue is when customer lists become
sufficiently defined, detailed, valuable, and otherwise protectable under
the In re Bass factors and other authorities.
Sharma v. Vinmar International, Ltd.58 explored this issue. Vinmar In-
ternational, Ltd. ("Vinmar") is a large, multi-national chemical trading
company. It brought suit against four former employees who had gone
out on their own to trade the chemical isoprene, a relatively rare product
which is used to manufacture adhesive products such as those used in
sticky pads, and another valuable chemical known as caprolactum. The
principal issue was whether Sharma and the others could use their con-
tacts and other information regarding the rare sources of these chemicals
in Russia and elsewhere, information about the highly-specialized, pres-
surized tanks used to store and transport these chemicals, and other fi-
nancial and related information, all of which they had learned in the
course of performing their various duties at Vinmar.
One might suppose that the chemical business is largely a commodity
enterprise, with open, lively, and highly visible markets, since chemicals
must ordinarily be uniform in their quality in order to be saleable at all.
One might further suppose that who is selling them, who is buying them,
and the current prices might be readily available; certainly the market is
wide enough and there are many standard reference works such as
56. REST. TORTS § 757 cmt. b. (1939).
57. Sharma v. Vinmar Int'l, 231 S.W.3d 405, 425 n.14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965
S.W.2d 18, 22 (Tex. App.-Houston[lst Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts
Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593, 603-04 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ); Rugen v. Interac-
tive Bus. Sys., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Am. Precision
Vibrator Co. v. Nat'l Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, no writ); David v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ); Collins v. Ryon's Saddle & Ranch Supplies, Inc.,
576 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no pet.)).
58. 231 S.W.3d 405 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
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"Who's Who In Chemistry" and the like giving contact information. Ac-
cording to the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals, however, it appears
that the business of trading chemicals is a highly personal business, "built
on relationships between the suppliers, traders, and purchasers of the
products."' 59 As a result, successful chemical trading companies like
Vinmar spend millions of dollars and many years developing the knowl-
edge bases behind their business.
In Sharma, the court of appeals went to pains to point out that this
knowledge base was substantially broader and deeper than a mere list of
contact information. This knowledge base included not simply run-of-
the-mill contact information found in readily-available sources, but infor-
mation as to exactly who within the trading companies, suppliers, and
purchasers would have decision-making authority; their preferences, such
as with respect to shipping methods; their seasonal, geographic, or other
needs; their requirements for storing particular chemicals; their sales and
purchase histories; their profit margins; and their respective policies.
60
There was also evidence of a "concerted effort" by Vinmar to maintain
the secret nature of this information. Much of it appeared fairly standard
among large businesses, including controlled access cards to the offices,
password-protection of computers, confidentiality agreements with em-
ployees, and employee manuals that emphasized the confidential nature
of the business, but it also extended to "limiting access to [this] informa-
tion on a need-to-know basis to the extent that Vinmar's [various] traders
[were] not allowed to look at each others' files." 61
It appeared to be significant also, that there was persuasive testimony
that this information would be very difficult for outsiders to duplicate, or
even to follow from publicly-available sources. The court noted that even
the defendants' highly educated trial counsel had trouble showing the
supply chain flow through publicly available sources.62 Therefore, apply-
ing the In re Bass factors,63 the court of appeals had little difficulty find-
ing sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Vinmar
had a probable right of recovery in asserting trade-secret protection as to
this knowledge base.
E. SHOWING THAT INFORMATION IS PUBLICLY AVAILABLE:
TIMING COUNTS
Defendants in trade-secret cases frequently try to weaken-if not alto-
gether defeat-trade-secret claims by showing that the information at is-
sue is generally known in the industry, or at least is readily available from
public sources. The Sharma decision 64 illustrates this step in practice and




63. In re Bass, 113 S.w.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003).
64. Sharma, 231 S.W.3d at 412.
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provides guidance on an important point of timing.
In Sharma, the defendants did undertake to gather the publicly-availa-
ble information in this area in an effort to show that it was generally
known in the industry or at least was readily available. However, they
apparently did not do so until after the litigation was filed, and only then
when instructed to do so by trial counsel. 65
Timing counts. The court of appeals noted pointedly that "the mere
fact that knowledge of a product or process may be acquired through
inspection, experimentation, and analysis does not preclude protection
from those who would secure that knowledge by unfair means .... The
question is not 'how could he have secured the knowledge?' but 'how did
he?" 66 The defendants' point might have been stronger had they been
able to show that they had gathered this information from publicly availa-
ble sources, rather than from their employer, before beginning to use it
for their own benefit-or, at least, before suit was filed.
F. SCOPE OF INJUNCTION: ADEQUATE PROTECTION, OR
RESTRICT LAWFUL COMPETITION?
In a temporary injunction hearing, the sole issue before the trial court
is whether the applicant may preserve the status quo of the litigation's
subject matter pending trial on the merits.67 The status quo is the last
actual, peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the pending
controversy. 68
In Sharma,69 the trial court ordered that "[n]o Defendant shall engage
in any way in the business of purchasing, transporting, storing, marketing,
selling or trading Isoprene Monomer that is produced in Russia or Capro-
lactum either supplied from Mexico or Belarus or sold in China."' 70 Was
that order appropriate to provide adequate protection for the trade
secrets at issue pending trial, or was it overbroad to the point that it un-
duly restricted lawful competition? 71
There were at least three choices open to the trial court: First, the court
might restrict the defendants from doing any transactions whatsoever in
isoprene or caprolactum, regardless of the source of the chemical or its
ultimate market or destination. The court thought this would have "com-
65. Id. at 426.
66. Id. at 424 (citing K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314S.W.2d 782, 788 (Tex. 1958); and Am. Precision Vibrator Co. v. Nat'l Air Vibrator Co., 764S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ)). Interestingly, this is the
second time this quote has appeared during the Survey period. See Astoria Indus. OfIowa, Inc. v. SNF Inc., 223 S.W.3d 616, 637 n.74 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet.
denied).
67. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).
68. RP&R, Inc. v. Territo, 32 S.W.3d 396, 402 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
no pet.).





pletely preserve[d] the actual status quo."'72 Second, the court might re-
strict the defendants' isoprene and caprolactum trade with respect to
Russian isoprene or Mexican or Belarus caprolactum, or that which is
sold in China, as the trial court decided to do. Or, third, the court might
prohibit the defendants from dealing with suppliers or customers whose
identities and deeper information they had learned through the improper
use and disclosure of Vinmar's confidential information, but leave the
door open for them to deal with new or different entities other than those
they had learned through Vinmar.
This latter was the choice favored by the dissent in Sharma. The dis-
sent observed that the defendants did, after all, have a limited legal right
to engage in international chemical trading. That right was limited by the
non-competition and confidentiality agreements they had signed, as well
as by the common law and contractual prohibition against the improper
use of Vinmar's trade secrets; but, if the defendants acted within those
boundaries, they could at least engage in international chemical trading.
The dissent criticized the majority for arbitrarily replacing "these contrac-
tual and common law limits with geographical boundaries, imposing bar-
riers based on the chemical's country of origin or sale."
73
The majority, however, viewed the injunction's breadth as necessary,
narrowly tailored to preserve the status quo, supported by the evidence,
and not restrictive of lawful competition.74 The court noted that "when a
choice must be made between a failure to provide adequate protection of
a recognized legal right and the punitive operation of the writ, the latter
course must be taken."'75 It added that "it is well-settled that injunctive
relief 'must, of necessity, be full and complete so that those who have
acted wrongfully and have breached their fiduciary relationship, as well
as those who willfully and knowingly have aided them in doing so, will be
effectively denied the benefits and profits flowing from the
wrongdoing.'- 76
Though not specified in the opinion, it appears that the nature of the
defendant's misconduct was very much on the court's mind. In applying
the In re Bass factors to determine whether Vinmar's information consti-
tuted a trade secret, the court if appeals noted that "[t]he status of the
information claimed as a trade secret must be determined through a com-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 436. The dissent added that an injunction "'may not be framed so broadly as
to prohibit the enjoyment of lawful rights."' Id. at 435 (quoting Kulkarni v. Braeburn Val-
ley W. Civic Ass'n, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no
writ)). The dissent also added that a temporary injunction is impermissibly overbroad if it
prohibits not only the use of confidential and proprietary information, but lawful conduct
as well. Id. at 436 (citing Sw. Research Inst. v. Keraplast Techs., Ltd., 103 S.W.3d 478, 482-
83 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.)). Consequently the dissent viewed the injunc-
tion as overbroad and its entry an abuse of discretion.
74. Id. at 429.
75. Id. (citing Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958)).
76. Id. at 429 (quoting Mabrey v. SandStream, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 302, 316 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)).
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parative evaluation of all the relevant factors, including the value, se-
crecy, and definiteness of the information as well as the nature of the
defendant's misconduct. '77
In this case, in the hearing record the court characterized as "remarka-
ble testimony" two of the defendants "admitted lying under oath. '78 One
defendant-in response to direct questioning by the trial court-"admit-
ted he had lied during his deposition as he was nervous and defensive
during the deposition and he lies when he gets nervous and defensive. '79
In addition, the court found that the testimony and documentary evi-
dence revealed "not only an effort to destroy relevant documents, but
also an attempt to insure the defendants were presenting a consistent
story."80 In these circumstances, the majority's preference for an order
which would be bright-line in nature and readily enforceable may hardly
be surprising.
IV. UNFAIR COMPETITION
A. UNFAIR COMPETITION, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND REMOVAL
Sometimes, in an effort to defeat removal to Federal court, a plaintiff
will plead very carefully only claims which arise solely under state law
and do not present a federal question. In re Hot-Hed, Inc.81 considered
whether claims raised in that way could have (perhaps inadvertently)
presented a federal question anyway and in the process added an interest-
ing note to the definition of "unfair competition" in Texas.
In Hot-Hed, Inc., the plaintiff brought suit asserting claims of trade-
mark dilution under the Texas Business and Commerce Code, trademark
infringement under Texas common law, and unfair competition under
Texas common law. In addition to legal and equitable relief, however, it
also sought recovery of attorney's fees and costs. The defendant removed
the case to federal district court, contending that removal was proper be-
cause Hot-Hed's request for attorneys' fees made its trademark claims
present a federal question-not a state cause of action-because attor-
neys' fees are not available for such claims under Texas state law and
must be available, if at all, under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.82 The
trial court denied the motion to remand, concluding that Hot-Hed's re-
quest for attorneys' fees must be authorized, if at all, only by federal law
and hence presented a federal question.8 3
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, di-
recting the trial court to consider whether the defendants could show di-
versity jurisdiction, but meanwhile holding that a federal question was
77. Id. at 425 (citing In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (emphasis supplied)).
78. Id. at 418.
79. Id. at 419.
80. Id.
81. 477 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2007).
82. Id. at 322; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
83. 477 F.3d at 322.
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certainly not involved. 84 One reason for this was because it was not so
clear that attorneys' fees could not be authorized under Texas law, for in
fact they could be recovered under the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act,
which permits recovery of "reasonable and necessary fees as are equita-
ble and just."' 85 The circuit court cited Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v.
Lake Lyndon B. Johnson Improvement Corp.,86 which held that a plaintiff
could recover attorney's fees for common law trademark infringement
and dilution under the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act.
87
Furthermore, even if the plaintiff had not adequately alleged a claim
for attorneys' fees under state law, that would not necessarily require that
the claim be interpreted as one brought under the federal Lanham Act.88
It only permits recovery of attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases."'8 9 In
any event, removal of a trademark infringement action is improper
"'when a plaintiff does not clearly state he is seeking relief under the
Lanham Act."' 90
Interestingly, the defendant asserted one other point before the fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, namely that the plaintiff's substantive counts
also presented a federal question. The defendant argued that the plaintiff
had set forth two independent causes of action for trademark infringe-
ment, one of which would necessarily arise under the Lanham Act. This
argument-which the court of appeals characterized as "appropriately
described ... as convoluted"-was that plaintiff could not allege one
claim for trademark infringement under Texas law, and a separate and
independent claim for unfair competition under Texas law.91
However, the plaintiff could, in fact, argue exactly that. Trademark in-
fringement actions would fall within "the larger umbrella of unfair com-
petition," but a defendant "'may be liable for unfairly competing without
having technically infringed a trademark." 9
2
V. CONSPIRACY
A. A DERIVATIVE TORT
Hong Kong Development, Inc. v. Nguyen93 provides a reminder that a
cause of action for conspiracy is actually a derivative tort, not an indepen-
dent one. If there is no underlying wrong or object, then there can be no
cause of action for conspiracy.
84. Id. at 326.
85. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 2008).
86. 53 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App-Austin 2001, pet. denied).
87. Id. at 814-15.
88. Hot-Hed, Inc., 477 F.3d at 324; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
89. Id. at 324 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)).
90. Id. (citing Johnson v. Tuff-N-Rumble Mgmt., Inc., No. 06-20893, 2002 W.L.
31819167, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2002)).
91. Id. at 325.
92. Id. (citing 13 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE,
§§ 200.24[2][c], 200.110[2][c] (2000)).
93. 229 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
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In this case, the First District Houston Court of Appeals determined
that the essential, underlying cause of action for tortious interference
could not be sustained. This doomed the claim for conspiracy. Where
the underlying wrong or object that was alleged (here, tortious interfer-
ence), could not be sustained, then there could be no conspiracy. 94
VI. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
A. SEPARATING THE ACTOR FROM THE PRINCIPAL
Hong Kong Development, Inc. was a complex landlord-tenant suit in-
volving family members separated by divorce. 95 As part of that action,
plaintiff sued an individual defendant who was both a corporate agent
and a third party who had allegedly induced the corporate defendant's
breach of contract.
When the defendant is both a corporate agent and is, himself, the third
party who allegedly induced the corporation's breach, the court of ap-
peals held that the individual defendant's motives must be examined
carefully. "Mixed motives-to benefit both himself and the corpora-
tion-are insufficient to establish liability."' 96 Instead, the "plaintiff must
prove that the agent acted willfully and intentionally to serve the agent's
personal interests at the corporation's expense."'97 This is often a difficult
showing to make, for the actions of an agent very typically benefit the
agent as well as benefitting its principal at the same time.
In determining whether an agent has acted against the corporation's
interests by allegedly inducing the corporation's breach of contract, for
purposes of determining whether the agent is liable for tortious interfer-
ence, the court held that it should consider the corporation's own evalua-
tion of the agent's actions. 98 The corporation may have complained or
disavowed those actions, or it may have remained silent. The court held
that although a complaint by the corporation would not conclusively
show that the agent acted against its principal's interest, the opposite
would indeed be true: if a corporation did not complain about its agent's
actions, then the agent could not be held to have acted contrary to the
corporation's interest.99
Here, there was no evidence that the individual defendant had acted
"solely in his own interests" as required to show tortious interference,
and consequently there was legally insufficient evidence to support the
tortious interference claim.1o
94. Id. at 448 (citing Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005); Tilton v. Marshall,
925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996)).
95. Hong Kong Dev., Inc., 229 S.W.3d at 415.
96. Id. at 447 (citing Powell Indus., Inc. v. Allen, 985 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1998)).
97. Id. at 427 (quoting Powell Indus., Inc., 985 S.W.2d at 456) (original emphasis)).
98. Id. (citing Powell Indus., Inc., 985 S.W.2d at 456).
99. Id. (citing Powell Indus., Inc., 985 S.W.2d at 456).
100. Id. (citing Powell Indus., Inc., 985, S.W.2d at 456).
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B. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE: WITH PROSPECTIVE CUSTOMERS, OR
WITH PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS FROM EXISTING CUSTOMERS?
In Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc.,10 1 Brand FX also
claimed that Astoria had tortiously interfered with Brand FX's prospec-
tive business relations.
To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with prospective busi-
ness relations, a plaintiff must show (1) a reasonable probability that
the plaintiff and third party would have entered into a contractual
relationship; (2) that an independently tortious or wrongful act by
the defendant prevented the relationship from occurring; (3) that the
defendant did the act with a conscious desire to prevent the relation-
ship from occurring or knew that the interference was certain or sub-
stantially certain to occur as a result of the conduct; and (4) that the
plaintiff incurred actual harm or damage as a result of the defen-
dant's interference. 102
Astoria replied that there was no evidence that it interfered with Brand
FX's business relationship with prospective customers. Instead, it argued
that Brand FX complained only "that Astoria took some of Brand FX's
business from only a single existing customer, Cook's Pest Control,
Inc."'103 The court of appeals held that the types of business relationships
protected against interference, however, include "continuing business
relationships. "10 4
According to the evidence, Cook's wanted a stair-step design for its
"toppers" on all of its trucks so that its fleet would have a consistent,
professional look, but until Astoria came on the scene, Cook's did not
know of any other company making "toppers" with a stair-step design
except Brand FX and Brand FX's now-bankrupt predecessor. The court
concluded that reasonable people could reach different conclusions as to
whether it was reasonably probable that Cook's would have continued to
purchase "toppers" from Brand FX if Astoria had not been able to manu-
facture a stair step topper, so there was more than a scintilla of evidence
as needed to support the first element of the tortious interference
claim.105
101. Astoria Indus. Of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., 223 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2007, pet. denied).
102. Id. at 632-33.
103. Id. at 633.
104. Id. at 633 (citing Heil-Quaker Corp. v. Mischer Corp., 863 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tex.
App.-Houston, [14th Dist.] 1993, writ granted, judgment vacated w.r.m., 877 S.W.2d 300
(Tex. 1994)); REST. (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B, cmts. a, c (1979) (types of business rela-
tions protected are business relations that have not yet been reduced to a contract and
continuing business or other customary relationships not amounting to a formal contract)).




A. SPECIAL DAMAGES MUST HAVE BEEN INCURRED,
NOT BE PROSPECTIVE
In Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc.,10 6 Astoria and Brand
FX were business competitors. They each manufactured and sold fiber-
glass service bodies and toppers for commercial trucks. "A topper is a
structure that covers the bed of a commercial truck. 1' 07
Brand FX alleged that in late 2002, Astoria developed a stair-step top-
per design virtually identical to the one Brand FX was making for its
customer Cook's Pest Control, in order to try and take over Cook's pest
control business by making essentially the same thing and offering it for
over $1,000.00 less than the price that Brand FX charged. Brand FX
claimed Astoria had "nefariously" obtained Brand FX's design drawings,
and had also run an unfair comparative advertisement a number of times
over the course of a year, describing "Brand X bodies" with the following
"(1) No Engineering and built with substandard materials; (2) Short-term
costs with long-term expenses; and (3) Built to their standard."' 0 8 Brand
FX brought claims for business disparagement, false advertising under
the Lanham Act, tortious interference, trade dress infringement, unfair
competition, common law misappropriation, and trade secret misappro-
priation. Astoria moved for traditional and/or no evidence summary
judgments on these claims, but the motions were denied.10 9
It is understood that to "prevail on a business disparagement claim, a
plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant published a false, defama-
tory statement of fact about the plaintiff, (2) with malice, (3) without
privilege, and (4) that resulted in special damages to the plaintiff."1 10
Special damages are often a difficult element to prove. "To prove special
damages, the plaintiff must prove that the disparaging communication
played a substantial part in inducing third parties not to deal with the
plaintiff, resulting in a direct pecuniary loss that has been realized or liq-
uidated, such as specific loss sales, loss of trade, or loss of other
dealings." '
Here, there was no immediate claim of any lost sales. Brand FX's
owner testified that "we don't know anybody that lost sales directly be-
106. 223 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied),
107. Id. at 622.
108. Id. at 622 (internal quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 623. In an interesting procedural point, the court of appeals noted that the
trial court's order denying the summary judgment was interlocutory and not appealable
except to the extent that its claims were based on a claim or defense arising under the free
speech clauses of the First Amendment and article 1, section 8, of the Texas Constitution.
See TEX. Civ. P. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (Vernon 2008). The court of appeals
held that the portion of the trial court's order denying summary judgment on Brand FX's
business disparagement, false advertising and tortious interference claims-the only claims
that Astoria defended on free speech grounds-were appealable. Astoria Indus., 223
S.W.3d at 627.
110. Id. at 628.
111. Id. (citing Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987)).
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
cause of the [Astoria] ad," and Brand FX's president testified that he
could not recall the identity of any customers who had refused to buy
Brand FX's products because of Astoria's actions.
112
Instead, Brand FX relied on the affidavit of an advertising expert, who
was of the opinion that Brand FX would have to spend approximately
$76,200 in corrective advertising over the next twelve months in order to
counteract Astoria's negative advertising. In Brand FX's view, this kind
of recovery would be supportable under section 633(1)(b) and comment
k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which provides that recov-
ery is also permitted for "the expense of measures reasonably necessary
to counteract the publication, such as the cost of notifying customers of
an injurious publication's falsity or the publication of denials."
The court of appeals, however, declined to view these as special dam-
ages sufficient to trigger liability for a business disparagement claim,
pointing out that Brand FX had not actually incurred any corrective ad-
vertising expenses yet. The expert's affidavit only attested to what Brand
FX might have to pay for such advertising if Brand FX were to choose to
purchase it. But the court observed that neither the Texas Supreme
Court nor any intermediate court of appeals had adopted this part of the
Restatement, or had held "that this type of pecuniary loss is compensable
in Texas in a business disparagement case." '113
Ever since Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. 114 was decided,
it has been understood that business disparagement is a difficult cause of
action to sustain in Texas, requiring strict proof, particularly because the
"special damages" rule is strictly applied. Astoria certainly holds that
corrective advertising which is proposed-but has not yet been spent-
will not suffice to show such special damages. The case gives a further
hint that costs of corrective advertising might not be sufficient to show
"special damages" even if they were spent to the last dime, though that
conclusion may be premature and should await further development.
VIII. FALSE ADVERTISING
A. THE LIMITS OF HYPERBOLE
Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc."1 5 presented a fairly rare
example of a Lanham Act section 43(a) claim being heard in a state court
of appeals rather than a Federal court. At issue were the specific state-
ments in Astoria's advertising, namely that "low quality Brand FX bod-
ies" have "no engineering and [are] built with substandard materials.""' 6
Particularly, under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, it was Plaintiff
Brand FX's burden to prove that these statements were either literally
112. Id. at 629.
113. Id. at 629 n.34.
114. 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987).
115. Astoria Indus., 223 S.W.3d at 616.
116. Id. at 630.
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false, or that they were likely to mislead and confuse others.11 7
Astoria urged that the "no engineering" statement was "'nothing more
than "rhetorical hyperbole,"' it being "simply inconceivable that readers
of a trade journal about utility and telecommunications service vehicles
would ever believe that a product could be manufactured without resort
to at least some engineering principals."1 18 To this extent the court of
appeals agreed, concluding that readers of ordinary intelligence would
realize that Brand FX's products were not without any engineering what-
soever, and instead would interpret the advertisement as a general claim
that Astoria's products were superior. 119 The court made this interpreta-
tion as a matter of law, and without reference to surveys of consumer
reaction, expert testimony on linguistics, or other external devices.
The statement that Brand FX's products were "built with substandard
materials," however, was substantially different. Here the question was
whether the word "substandard" would be a statement of fact or one of
opinion. Generally, statements of objective facts state "a 'specific and
measurable claim, capable of being proved false or of being reasonably
interpreted as a statement of objective fact," 120 while statements of mere
opinion are not so capable of being proven right or wrong.
In some contexts, references to a product as "substandard" might be
mere opinion; but the court held that this was not such context. Instead,
the court observed that the "types of materials Brand FX uses, as well as
their quality and durability when compared to the materials used by As-
toria and other manufacturers, are facts that can be verified. ' 12 1 Addi-
tionally, the context of the statement made it clear that these materials
were to be compared to those of Astoria, whose products were said to be
built with "quality" materials to be "long-lasting and durable.
122
Thus, in the court's view, the context and verifiability of the statements
could lead a reader of ordinary intelligence to perceive this statement as
one of fact-namely, that Brand FX's products were manufactured using
materials of lesser quality than those typical in the industry and, unlike
Astoria's products, are therefore "not durable and will not last very
long."' 123 Thus, the court of appeals therefore held that the statement
that Brand FX's products are "built with substandard materials" is "not
mere opinion but is a statement of fact."1 24 It was, furthermore, false,
according to the affidavit of Brand FX's owner and vice president, who
testified that Brand FX only used materials which were above accepted
industry-standard quality in its products. 125
117. Id. (citing Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2000)).
118. Id. at 630-31.
119. Id. at 631.
120. Id. at 629 n.36 (quoting Pizza Hut, Inc., 227 F.3d at 495).
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